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The increase in unemployment in the United Kingdom that accompanied the Great 
Recession has been conspicuous by its moderation. The rise in joblessness is dwarfed 
by the recent experience of the United States, by past recessionary episodes in the U.K. 
and by the contraction in GDP in the U.K. Increased rates of job loss have played a 
dominant role in shaping the rise in British unemployment. Unemployment duration has 
not increased to the levels seen in previous recessions, in contrast to the U.S. where 
duration substantially exceeds previous peaks. Looking forward, the U.K. labour market 
appears to have adjusted fully to the shocks that prompted the recession. Signs of 
reductions in match efficiency witnessed recently in the U.S. are not mirrored in the U.K. 
In contrast, while long-term unemployment currently remains well below historical 
levels, recent estimates of job finding rates suggest that it has the potential to rise much 
further. Thus, a timely recovery in aggregate demand will play an important role in 
averting persistently high unemployment in the future.  
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Introduction 
The severity of the recession that accompanied the global financial crisis in 2008 has led many to 
refer to it as the Great Recession. Labour market outcomes in the United States, where the crisis 
originated, have deteriorated at an unprecedented rate. On the other side of the Atlantic, the 
United Kingdom has experienced its first recession in over fifteen years. In this paper we study 
the impact of the Great Recession on the U.K. labour market, and cast it in the broader context of 
past recessions in the U.K. and the recent experience of the U.S. economy.  
We find that the increase in U.K. unemployment during the recent recession has been remarkably 
modest. This basic conclusion is confirmed by comparisons of the recent rise in joblessness to 
increases in unemployment witnessed in the U.K. in prior recessions, the reduction in GDP 
associated with the recession in the U.K., and the severity of the impact of the recession on the 
U.S. labour market. 
What factors account for this moderate unemployment response in the U.K.? Digging deeper into 
the flows that underlie the recent rise in joblessness reveals that the British labour market has 
been afflicted by an unusually steep rise in the rate at which workers flow into the 
unemployment pool. Rates of job loss in the U.K. have risen more than in any downturn in the 
last forty years.  
The muted rise in British joblessness can instead be traced to a moderate decline in the rate at 
which unemployed workers have found jobs, and an associated modest rise in unemployment 
duration. This is borne out in comparisons with the experiences witnessed recently in the U.S. 
economy and in the U.K. recessions of the 1970s and 1980s, where declining rates of job finding 
have been dominant driving forces. Moreover, this conclusion is not a symptom of the more 
stringent restrictions associated with the duration of unemployment benefit claims in the U.K. 
since the introduction of Jobseekers’ Allowance in 1997: Estimates of the job-finding prospects 
of the unemployed based on a broader definition of the unemployed corroborate the conclusion. 
Early signs for the outlook for the British labour market are more mixed. Analysis of the co-
movement of unemployment and vacancies—the Beveridge curve—reveals that the U.S. labour 
market has shown recent signs of a decline in match efficiency: The recovery of job openings in 
the U.S. has not been met by commensurate declines in unemployment. In contrast, the U.K. 
labour market has not (yet) shown signs of a magnitude similar to that seen in the U.S. 
It is also possible to construct a leading indicator of the future course of unemployment from the 
underlying flows, known as the “flow steady-state” unemployment rate. Recent estimates 
suggest that the headline U.K. unemployment rate has converged fully to its flow steady-state, 
implying that unemployment in the U.K. has adjusted fully to the shocks that prompted the 
recession.  
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A particular concern for the U.K. economy is that unemployment will stay persistently high in 
the wake of the recession, as seen during the unemployment problem of the 1980s. Prior 
literature emphasised the importance of the rise in long-term unemployment during the 1980s in 
driving persistently high rates of joblessness.  
Analysis of the most recent data for the U.K. suggests there has been a modest rise in long-term 
unemployment to date. Nevertheless, there are reasons for caution. It was between 4 and 5 years 
before long-term unemployment peaked after the start of the 1980s recession, and the peak was 
reached about 3 years after the 1990s recession. Rates of job finding have now fallen to levels 
seen during the 1990s recession, raising the concern that long-term unemployment will continue 
to rise in the U.K.  Thus, a swift recovery in aggregate demand is important to avert the prospect 
of persistently high unemployment in the future. 
Unemployment and GDP 
Our main focus in this paper is to document the cyclical behaviour of unemployment over the 
course of the current recession. To set the stage, Figure 1 plots the published time series for the 
unemployment rate in the U.K. and the U.S. from the early 1970s through to the most recent 
data.  
Prior to 2000, Figure 1 tells a familiar story: Rates of unemployment in the U.K. and the U.S. co-
move, rising together in recessions, and subsiding in booms. In the recessions of the early 1980s 
and the early 1990s, unemployment in the U.K. tended to rise more, and to persist for longer 
after the downturns receded, reflecting the persistent unemployment problem that plagued the 
U.K. and other European economies during the 1980s. It is striking that the U.K. unemployment 
rate did not fall back to a pre-1980s level until after the recession of the 1990s. 
The story since 2000 has been quite different, however. The U.K. was spared from the recession 
that hit the U.S. and a number of other economies in the early 2000s. In addition, the rise in 
unemployment witnessed in the U.K. over the course of the current recession has been 
conspicuous by its moderation: Unemployment in the U.K. rose from 5.1 percent in early 2008 
to a recessionary high of 8 percent in early 2010. This 2.9 percentage point increase is modest in 
comparison both to past recessionary episodes in the U.K., as well as the recent experience of the 
U.S. labour market. It is overshadowed by the downturns of the early 1980s and early 1990s in 
the U.K., which saw increases in joblessness of 6.5 and 3.7 percentage points respectively. And 
it is dwarfed by the 5.5 percentage point rise in unemployment witnessed in the U.S. during the 
current downturn. In fact, the rise in U.K. unemployment since 2008 is more reminiscent of the 
mild downturns of 1990 and 2001 in the U.S. and 1975 in the U.K. 
What might account for the relatively benign rise in U.K. joblessness? One possible reason might 
be that the current recession simply has not been that severe in the U.K. To address this 
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possibility, a natural point of comparison is the contraction in output that accompanied the 
recession.  
Figure 2 performs such a comparison by depicting the relationship between unemployment and 
GDP in the U.K. and the U.S. since the early 1970s—Okun’s Law. Specifically, it plots the 
percentage point deviation from trend of the unemployment rate (measured on the left axis), and 
the percent deviation from trend of GDP (right axis). For all series, trends are measured using a 
Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 1600 based on quarterly data. 
Figure 2 reveals that, in contrast to the modest rise in unemployment, GDP in the U.K. has fallen 
by 6 percent relative to trend over the course of the 2008-9 recession. The magnitude of the 
contraction in GDP mirrors that seen in the severe early 1980s recession in the U.K., and is 
almost identical to the drop in GDP seen in the U.S. during the current downturn.  
The picture painted by Figure 2 therefore suggests that the rise in the unemployment in the U.K. 
has been moderate despite the severity of the recession. In what follows we will offer some clues 
for why this has been the case by examining the flows that underlie the rise in unemployment.  
If unemployment has not borne the brunt of U.K. labour market adjustment in the recession, 
what has? The counterpart of the muted rise in unemployment has been the maintenance of a 
relatively high employment rate (see Gregg and Wadsworth, 2010). As Gregg and Wadsworth 
also show, although hours have fallen and the share of part-time working has risen, it is not the 
case that hours have taken the impact of adjustment, as hours have fallen less than in prior U.K. 
recessions. As Gregg and Wadsworth note, some of the burden has been borne by producer 
wages, as these have fallen further in this recession than in previous downturns, which has 
helped to maintain firm profitability. Real earnings declines have presumably contributed to 
firms’ ability to survive the recession without further job losses, despite the fall in productivity 
that has been a consequence of the moderate fall in employment relative to the large decline in 
output. 
The ins and outs of cyclical unemployment 
The analysis so far has focused on a series of snapshots of the number of individuals in want of 
work at different points in time. In reality, the identities of these individuals are continually 
changing: Workers flow into the unemployment pool as they lose their jobs, and unemployed 
workers exit the pool as they find new jobs. These flows play a crucial role as proximate 
determinants of increased unemployment in times of recession. Are cyclical upswings in the 
unemployment rate an outcome of increased rates of inflow into the unemployment pool, 
reductions in the rate at which individuals exit unemployment, or some combination of the two? 
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We take up this question by documenting recent estimates of the rates of inflow to and outflow 
from unemployment, and placing them in the context of the historical behaviour of labour flows 
in the U.K. and U.S. 
The data we explore for the U.K. are drawn from two complementary sources. First, we use 
direct measures of inflows to and outflows from claimant unemployment—those in receipt of 
unemployment benefits.1 These yield very simple estimates of claimant unemployment flows. 
The claimant inflow rate can be computed by dividing total monthly inflows by employment.2 
Similarly, the claimant outflow rate may be computed by taking the ratio of total monthly 
outflows and the number of claimant unemployed. 
A key advantage of these data is that they are available back to the late 1960s, allowing a 
comparative analysis of the cyclical dynamics of U.K. unemployment flows across a number of 
recessions. Data from 1983 onwards are publicly available from the Office for National 
Statistics. We combine these series with data prior to 1983 assembled by Petrongolo and 
Pissarides (2008) from the Employment Gazette. 
A drawback of the claimant data, however, is that they pertain to claimant unemployment, as 
opposed to the more widely-accepted ILO definition.3 While the correlation between these two 
measures of unemployment historically has been high, especially over the business cycle, there 
have been changes in the regulations governing the receipt of unemployment benefit—most 
notably the introduction of Job Seekers’ Allowance in 1997—that limit the comparability of the 
series over time. 
Reacting to this, we also explore estimates of U.K. unemployment flows based on longitudinally-
linked microdata from the Labour Force Survey, in which unemployment is based on the ILO 
definition. The introduction of a five-quarter rolling panel element to the LFS in 1992 makes it 
possible to match a fraction of the responses of individuals surveyed in one quarter to the same 
individual’s responses one quarter later. Thus, one can compute the fraction of the employed in 
one quarter who subsequently report that they are unemployed the following quarter—what we 
shall refer to as the E to U transition rate. Symmetrically, we also compute estimates of the rate 
at which unemployed workers find new jobs—the U to E transition rate.  
While these LFS measures are analogous to the unemployment inflow and outflow rates 
computed from claimant data, it is important to note that there are conceptual differences. In 
addition to being based on a different definition of the unemployment rate, claimant inflows 
                                                 
1 To maximise the time span of the data, the claimant count measures we use refer to Great Britain as opposed to the 
U.K. as a whole. 
2 The employment measure used to compute the claimant inflow rate is the associated ONS workplace-based 
estimate. Monthly employment figures are derived by subtracting the number unemployed from the implied labour 
force, the latter calculated as the level of unemployment divided by the workplace-based estimate of the 
unemployment rate. 
3 According to the ILO definition, to be classified as unemployed an individual must be not working, currently 
available for work and actively seeking work, or waiting to take up a job. 
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include inflows from nonparticipation to unemployment, as well as outflows from 
unemployment to nonparticipation that are excluded from the estimated E to U and U to E 
transition rates from the LFS.  
For the U.S., we infer measures of unemployment inflow and outflow rates from published 
monthly Current Population Survey time series on unemployment by duration, based on the 
method outlined by Shimer (2007) and used subsequently by a growing literature. The CPS 
unemployment definition underlying these series is comparable to the ILO definition used by the 
LFS.   
The respective time series for these unemployment flows for the U.K. and the U.S. are depicted 
in Figures 3 and 4. Shaded regions correspond to periods of rising unemployment in the U.K. 
and to the official recession dates for the U.S. suggested by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research.4 
Prior to the current recession, Figures 3 and 4 tell the following story of the nature of labour 
market adjustment in the U.K. and U.S. First, there have been substantial differences in the 
average levels of unemployment flows between the two countries: Unemployment inflow and 
outflow rates historically have been much lower in the U.K. than in the U.S. Moreover, the 
differences are substantial. Inflow rates in the U.K. have hovered around 1 percent on a monthly 
basis, compared to something closer to 3 percent in the U.S. Similarly, unemployed workers in 
the U.K. have on average flowed out of the unemployment pool at a rate of around 20 percent 
per month since the 1970s, compared to 55 percent in the U.S. These stark differences reflect the 
conventional wisdom that the U.K. labour market, like others in Europe, has historically been 
sclerotic, in contrast to the particularly fluid nature of the U.S. labour market.5  
A second lesson of Figures 3 and 4 is that there are clear historical patterns in the dynamics of 
unemployment flows over the business cycle in both economies. During recessions, rises in 
unemployment are accompanied by sharp rises in the inflow rate that subside following the 
recession, together with prolonged reductions in the rate of outflow from unemployment that can 
persist well into a recovery. This persistence in the outflow rate has been more acute in the U.K., 
however, with job-finding prospects barely recovering after the recessions of the mid-1970s and 
the early 1980s. This dovetails with the persistent unemployment problem during the 1980s in 
the U.K. noted in Figure 1, and suggests that the problem can be traced in its entirety to 
sluggishness in the rate of exit from unemployment, a point noted by Machin and Manning 
(1999). 
Focusing now on the current recession, a quite different picture emerges. The behaviour of 
unemployment flows in both the U.K. and the U.S. has been unprecedented in recent history. 
                                                 
4 NBER recession dates are available at http://www.nber.org/cycles.html. 
5 See Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin (2009) for a detailed analysis of the varying patterns of unemployment flows across 
OECD countries. 
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Interestingly, though, the nature of this divergence from the past has occurred in opposite 
directions in each economy. 
The U.S. labour market has witnessed a profound reduction in the outflow rate. Figure 4 reveals 
that the rate of exit from unemployment in the U.S. has been halved over the course of the 
recession, overshadowing the declines witnessed in all recent recessions. Moreover, unemployed 
workers in the U.S. are leaving the jobless pool at a historically low rate of 25 percent per month.  
In direct contrast, the U.K. labour market has experienced an unusually steep rise in the 
unemployment inflows, while outflow rates have fallen modestly. At its peak in the second 
quarter of 2009, the claimant inflow rate had risen by nearly 80 percent relative to its pre-
recession level, much more than in any prior downturn in the U.K. since the 1970s.  
The acceleration in job loss between 2008 and 2009 appears inconsistent with a ‘labour 
hoarding’ explanation for the muted increase in unemployment: the steep rise in the E to U 
inflow rate suggests that firms had relatively little hesitation in reducing their workforce size.6 
The claimant outflow rate has fallen by less than might have been anticipated given previous 
experience. The outflow rate from JSA slowed only to the same level as in 2005, when the 
economy suffered a relatively minor deceleration in growth, from 3 per cent per annum in 2004 
to 2.2 per cent in 2005. The comparatively modest decline in the outflow rate in the U.K. is not 
merely a symptom of the introduction of limited duration unemployment benefits in the form of 
JSA in 1997. While the reduction in the claimant outflow rate is unusually mild in current 
recession, a similar picture emerges from estimates of the U to E transition rate based on the LFS 
definition of unemployment.  
The joint result of these two recent trends—unprecedented declines in unemployment outflow 
rates in the U.S. and more limited declines in the U.K.—is that, for the first time in nearly four 
decades, British and American workers face about the same probability of exiting the 
unemployment pool. 
The roles of job loss and job finding 
These observations are suggestive of a conclusion that job loss has played a particularly 
dominant role in driving increased rates of unemployment during the current recession in the 
U.K. economy, especially in comparison to recent experience in the U.S. But can we be more 
precise about the relative roles of inflow and outflow rates in shaping cyclical movements in the 
unemployment rate?  
                                                 
6 The rapid rise in the unemployment inflow rate occurred from a very low level—lower than at any time since 
1970—so the level of the inflow rate to unemployment remains lower than in previous recessions. This is consistent 
with firm profitability being relatively high going into recession and remaining relatively buoyant, and with rapid 
falls in producer wages (Gregg and Wadsworth, 2010). 
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A useful rule of thumb that has evolved out of recent literature is that the percentage increase in 
unemployment is approximately equal to the percentage rise in the inflow rate into 
unemployment plus the percentage decline in the outflow rate from unemployment.7 Thus, the 
relative contributions of the two flow margins to cyclical unemployment can be gleaned from a 
simple comparison of the relative percentage change in each of the flows. 
Figure 5 plots these contributions for each cyclical upswing in unemployment in the U.K. and 
U.S. since the mid 1970s. The picture that is revealed for the U.S. suggests that increased rates of 
inflow into unemployment account for around a third of increased unemployment during severe 
recessions, with the remaining two thirds accounted for by a slowing of the outflow rate. In 
contrast, the mild recessions of 1990 and 2001 in the U.S. display a more muted inflow 
contribution. In all recessions, increased inflows are more dominant early on in the downturn, 
with more persistent declines in outflow rates that dominate toward the later stages of the 
recession. 
How does the U.K. compare? Well, the story prior to the recession of the early 1990s resembles 
the dynamics of U.S. unemployment flows, with elevated rates of inflow accounting for around 
one third of increased unemployment during the recessions of the mid 1970s and early 1980s. 
Thus, declines in the outflow rate were a dominant driving force behind U.K. unemployment 
prior to the 1990s.8 Starting with the 1990 recession, however, the relative role of inflows in 
shaping the evolution of unemployment in the U.K. has become increasingly dominant, 
accounting for a little over one half of the rise in joblessness during the early 1990s.  
This trend toward a growing role of job loss in U.K. unemployment fluctuations has continued 
into the current recession. Both the claimant-based inflow and outflow measures and the LFS 
estimates of the job loss and job finding rates reveal that increased rates of inflow into 
unemployment have dominated the recent rise in unemployment in the U.K., especially early on 
in the recession. 
Since mid-2009 there is some difference between movements in the LFS U to E transition rate 
and the claimant outflow rate.9 According to LFS data for the latest recession, after initial 
dominance of an increased rate of job loss in determining unemployment movements, the job 
                                                 
7 See Elsby, Michaels and Solon (2009). This approximation does require that unemployment be closely 
approximated by its flow steady-state value. See Elsby, Hobijn and Şahin (2009) for a related decomposition that 
allows for deviations from steady state, and Smith (forthcoming) for a non-steady-state decomposition that separates 
inactivity flows from those between unemployment and employment. 
8 This observation has been noted since Pissarides (1986), who was among the first to emphasise the importance of 
declining outflow rates in driving the unemployment problem that arose in 1980s Britain. 
9 There are a number of potential reasons for this discrepancy. First, flows out of the labour force are included in the 
claimant data, but not in the LFS U to E flows. Second, claimant data cover a subsample of the unemployed. Those 
not claiming JSA appear to have found it more difficult to obtain jobs compared to claimants. However, available 
data indicate that these two explanations cannot account fully for the discrepancy between claimant and LFS flow 
estimates. It remains an open question which of these sources most reliably captures the contribution of 
unemployment outflows to cyclical unemployment variation. 
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finding rate took over the largest role in the latter stages of the recession (see Figure 5). The 
declining rate of job finding was offset by fewer job losses, with the result that LFS 
unemployment stabilised (see Figure 1). 
Outlook for the future in the U.K. 
The evidence we have presented so far suggests that the U.K. economy has experienced a 
relatively mild unemployment response over the course of the recent recession. A natural 
question is whether the same moderation will be observed as the British economy moves toward 
recovery. As noted above, there are historical reasons to be concerned: Unemployment in the 
U.K. remained persistently high following all prior recessions. Will the same be the case this 
time around? 
The answer of course depends in large part on how shocks to the U.K. economy unfold in the 
future, which are notoriously difficult to predict. But there are also clues that lie in the data that 
are already available. In what follows, we highlight a few of these clues and their role in the 
prognosis for the U.K. labour market. 
We show how the steady-state unemployment rate implied by labour market flows can indicate 
whether the labour market is in equilibrium, or is still adjusting to the shock of recession. We 
highlight how the relationship between vacancies and unemployment can suggest whether the 
labour market is efficiently matching workers to jobs. And, finally, we investigate 
unemployment persistence. 
Actual vs. flow steady-state unemployment 
A useful by-product of an analysis of unemployment flows is that changes in these flows provide 
advance warning of the rate at which unemployment is likely to increase in the future. To see 
why, a simple equation is instructive. Denoting unemployment by ܷ and the labour force by ܮ, 
we can write: 
ܥ݄ܽ݊݃݁	݅݊	ܷ ൌ ܫ݂݈݊݋ݓ	ݎܽݐ݁ ൈ ሺܮ െ ܷሻ െ ܱݑݐ݂݈݋ݓ	ݎܽݐ݁ ൈ ܷ.	 
If the inflow rate into unemployment and the outflow rate from unemployment were held fixed 
over time, the unemployment rate would converge to its flow steady-state value: 
ݑ∗ ൌ ܫ݂݈݊݋ݓ	ݎܽݐ݁ܫ݂݈݊݋ݓ	ݎܽݐ݁ ൅ ܱݑݐ݂݈݋ݓ	ݎܽݐ݁. 
In reality, the unemployment rate is continually evolving toward a moving target—its flow 
steady-state value—which shifts over time as unemployment inflow and outflow rates change.  
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Thus, changes in unemployment flows provide prognostic information about the future path of 
the unemployment rate: If flow steady-state unemployment lies above actual unemployment, 
then unemployment will rise, and vice versa. 
What does this exercise imply for current recession in the U.K.? Figure 6 plots the ONS time 
series for the unemployment rate against estimates of the flow steady-state unemployment rate 
based on LFS microdata back to 1975. Consistent with the reckoning above, changes in the flow 
steady-state unemployment rate are a leading indicator of changes in the actual unemployment 
rate.10 The current recession is no exception in this regard: Steady-state unemployment rose 
sharply at the start of the downturn to reach a peak of 9 percent in early 2009; actual 
unemployment followed, with a lag of around three quarters. More recently, steady-state 
unemployment has settled down to hover around 8 percent, only a little above the unemployment 
rate witnessed in the most recent data.  
It is important to note that this analysis does not build in any information on how future changes 
in British unemployment will be shaped by the strength of the recovery in aggregate demand in 
the economy. But what it does suggest is that the British labour market has to a large extent 
already adjusted to the shocks faced by the U.K. economy up to the first quarter of 2010. In the 
absence of further shocks, either good or bad, unemployment in the U.K. would be expected to 
remain around 8 percent over the short run. 
The Beveridge curve 
A crucial determinant of the evolution of the recovery in the U.K. labour market is a rebound in 
job creation. One can think of a reduction in unemployment being predicated on two conditions. 
First, are job openings being created? And, second, how effectively will such job openings be 
filled? 
To get a sense of the state of job creation in the U.K. economy, we examine the behaviour of 
vacancies over the course of the recession. For this purpose, we explore monthly data from the 
ONS Vacancy Survey for the U.K. from June 2001 to May 2010, and contrast it with BLS data 
from the Job Openings and Labour Turnover Survey (JOLTS) from December 2000 to May 2010 
for the U.S.11 
                                                 
10 This ‘leading indicator’ characteristic of steady state unemployment was also noted by Smith (forthcoming), using 
British Household Panel Survey microdata. Smith (forthcoming) and Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin (2009) also show that 
the speed of convergence of actual unemployment to the flow steady state is faster, the higher are inflow and 
outflow rates—the more fluid are labour market dynamics. 
11 The ONS Vacancy Survey and JOLTS define vacancies in similar ways. In both cases, the data represent the stock 
of vacancies (rather than the flow of new vacancies). ONS Vacancy Survey respondents are asked to enter (via their 
telephone keypad) their current number of vacancies, defined  as positions that are newly created, unoccupied or 
available in the near future, where the employer is actively trying to fill the position and the position is available to 
people outside the organisation. In JOLTS, job openings are defined as all positions that are open (not filled), where 
the position could be filled within 30 days (subject to successful search), and where the firm is actively recruiting 
from outside the establishment. 
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Figure 7 plots the relationship between vacancies as a fraction of the labour force and the 
unemployment rate—the Beveridge curve—in the U.K. and U.S. In both economies, we see a 
clear negative relation emerge over the course of the current recession with job openings falling 
as the unemployment rate rises. Interestingly, the slope of the Beveridge curve relation has been 
quite similar across the two economies over the course of the current recession: A one 
percentage point decline in the vacancy rate has been associated with something like a four 
percentage point rise in the unemployment rate in both the U.K. and the U.S. 
Figure 7 also highlights important differences in the evolution of the Beveridge curve in the U.K. 
and U.S. during the Great Recession. The moderate rise in unemployment in the U.K. has been 
accompanied by an equally moderate decline in job openings, again suggesting that the U.K. 
labour market has been relatively insulated from the vagaries of the recession when compared to 
the U.S.  
What insights does the Beveridge curve provide for the prospects of recovery in the wake of the 
recession? Recent U.S. experience, illustrated by the most south-easterly corner of Figure 7B, 
has witnessed a recovery in job openings that has not been met by a reduction in unemployment 
commensurate with the U.S. Beveridge curve. This observation has fuelled concerns of a 
reduction in the efficiency with which the U.S. economy matches unemployed workers with 
suitable vacancies.12 Such a breakdown in match efficiency would imply that the recovery of the 
U.S. labour market could be retarded by persistently high unemployment rates. 
The recent picture for the U.K. in Figure 7A appears at first sight to be more comforting. The 
evidence for a breakdown in match efficiency similar to that seen in the U.S. seems much 
weaker. But closer inspection reveals that a more accurate conclusion is that it is simply too soon 
to tell: Neither vacancies nor unemployment have yet shown any resolute signs of recovery in 
the most recent data for the U.K. The evolution of the Beveridge curve, and in particular the 
potential emergence of similar trends to those seen in the U.S., will therefore be something to 
monitor going forward in the U.K. 
A further point to bear in mind when considering the likely paths of U.K. and U.S. 
unemployment is the historically lower rate of vacancy creation in the U.K. Figure 7 shows that 
in recent non-recession years, the number of vacancies was around one-third lower in the U.K. 
than in the U.S., per person active in the labour market. This tallies with the slower U.K. outflow 
rate from unemployment highlighted in Figure 3, and—if repeated in coming years—would 
imply that high unemployment will persist for longer in the U.K.  
Long-term unemployment and duration dependence 
We noted above that a key feature of Figure 1 is the relative persistence of the unemployment 
rate in the U.K. compared to the U.S. in the aftermath of recessions in the past. This observation 
                                                 
12 See Elsby, Hobijn and Şahin (2010).   
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prompted a vast literature on the causes and consequences of persistent unemployment in 
Europe.13 That literature pointed to the rise of long-term unemployment, and the concomitant 
reduction in the search effectiveness of the unemployed, as an important driving force behind the 
European unemployment problem that developed in the 1980s. 
To reiterate the predominance of long-term unemployment in the U.K. labour market of the past, 
Figure 8 plots the fraction of the labour force that has been unemployed for more than six 
months in the U.K. and the U.S. from the mid-1970s onward.14 Data for the U.K. are again 
derived from LFS microdata; data for the U.S. are taken from published CPS time series. 
At the peaks seen 3 to 5 years after the recessions of the early 1980s and 1990s, long-term 
unemployment exceeded respectively 7 and 6 percent of the labour force in the U.K. The 
analogous figures for the U.S. over the same period were much smaller: 2.5 and 1.6 percent. 
In comparison, the subsequent trends for both countries are remarkable in Figure 8. Long-term 
unemployment in the U.K. plummeted in the late 1990s to reach levels below 2 percent of the 
labour force. Long-term unemployment in Britain at the height of the current recession is only a 
little above that seen in the boom of the late 1980s, mirroring the modest decline in 
unemployment outflow rates seen in Figure 3.15 In contrast, long-term unemployment in the U.S. 
has risen so much that it is now on a par with the corresponding U.K. figures, reflecting the 
convergence of unemployment outflow rates seen in Figures 3 and 4. 
The concern that arises in the light of the rise in long-term unemployment in Figure 8 is that such 
changes in the duration composition of the unemployment pool can influence the pace of 
recovery in unemployment. As noted above, previous literature has suggested that the long-term 
unemployed are less likely to search effectively for jobs. 
Figure 9 plots rates of job finding—the U to E transition rates—for those who are unemployed 
for different durations using LFS microdata back to 1992. Consistent with the notion that the 
long-term unemployed are less effective at finding jobs, those unemployed for longer durations 
face markedly lower job finding rates—so called negative duration dependence. Job seekers with 
less than one month’s duration find jobs at an average rate of over 15 percent per month, 
compared to less than 5 percent for those with greater than twelve month’s duration.16 
                                                 
13 The classic reference for this literature remains Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991). 
14 Past literature on European unemployment typically defined long-term unemployment as spells lasting for more 
than one year. We focus on durations in excess of six months in Figure 8 because historically a very small fraction 
of the unemployed in the U.S. has been unemployed for more than a year. 
15 Gregg and Wadsworth (2010) also note the relatively low level of U.K. long-term unemployment at this point in 
the cycle. 
16 The negative correlation between unemployment duration and the job-finding rate can arise either through 
unemployment scarring (true duration dependence) or worker heterogeneity (‘self-selection’ into long-term 
unemployment). It is unemployment scarring that is of particular concern in the context of recession and recovery. 
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The interaction of this negative duration dependence with increases in long-term unemployment 
can lead to a sluggish recovery in job-finding rates in the future. Intuitively, the unemployment 
pool increasingly becomes comprised of job seekers who are particularly unlikely to find jobs, 
and it takes time for this residue to filter out of the pool. 
Figure 9 reveals that there is reason to believe that such changes in duration composition have 
played an important role in shaping the job finding rate in the U.K. prior to the current recession. 
In particular, the long reduction in British unemployment from the 1990s onward appears to have 
been aided by a continual improvement in the duration composition of the unemployment pool.  
To see this, Figure 9 superimposes the aggregate job finding rate since 1992. Comparison of the 
aggregate U to E transition rate with the counterparts for each duration group reveals that the 
aggregate job finding rate rose more steeply than the constituent rates by duration. Thus, during 
the 1990s, rising job finding rates faced by each duration group fuelled an improvement in the 
duration composition of the unemployed, which in turn improved aggregate job finding 
outcomes.  
To what extent might these forces blight a recovery in job finding going forward? Our 
comparison above of actual and flow steady-state unemployment rates suggested that 
unemployment had mostly adjusted to the shocks faced in the U.K. until now. However, that 
analysis did not take account of the fact that the duration composition of the unemployment pool 
may continue to change for the worse in the future.  
Figure 9 suggests that job finding rates for each duration group appear to have returned to levels 
close to those that prevailed in the early 1990s recession in the U.K. This observation has both 
positive and negative ramifications for the future course of the British labour market. The good 
news is that long-term unemployment, at 4 percent of the labour force, is currently not even close 
to the levels seen at this stage during the 1990s recession (see Figure 8).  
The bad news is that job finding rates for each duration group regulate how fast workers of 
differing durations exit the unemployment pool, and thereby shape the duration composition of 
the unemployed in the future. It follows that, given rates of job finding are now similar to their 
levels in the early 1990s, the long-term unemployment share may return to levels seen in the 
aftermath of the 1990s recession. The concern, then, is that the U.K. labour market once again 
will converge to an equilibrium of high and persistent unemployment. 
The rate of increase in long-term unemployment has so far been similar to previous U.K. 
recessions. However, the recent rise has occurred from the basis of a much lower level than in 
earlier downturns, so even if the share of long-term unemployment does increase to match past 
recessions, levels of long-term and overall unemployment should remain below previous peaks. 
If the path of the 1990s recession is followed, long-term unemployment is likely to peak by the 
end of 2010 at below 5 per cent of the labour force (compared to over 7.5 per cent and around 6 
per cent in the 1980s and 1990s recessions respectively). But, if the pattern is more like the 
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1980s, long-term unemployment would continue to rise until the end of 2011, when it could 
exceed 6 per cent of the labour force.   
This brings into focus the importance of a swift recovery in aggregate demand, and thereby in 
vacancies and job finding rates of—in particular—the newly unemployed, in driving future 
reductions in British unemployment. A postponement of recovery in economic activity will 
render more likely an accumulation of long-term unemployed job seekers who face especially 
low job finding prospects, slowing declines in joblessness. 
Conclusion 
To date, the U.K. labour market has experienced a remarkably benign rise in joblessness during 
the current recession. This mild response has occurred despite an acute contraction in GDP, and 
is dwarfed by the rise in unemployment seen in past recessions in the U.K. and by the recent 
surge in unemployment in the U.S.  
Further analysis of British unemployment flows reveals that unusually large upswings in rates of 
job loss have been offset by more modest reductions in rates of job finding among the 
unemployed. More than in any other recession in the last forty years, the current rise in 
unemployment has been dominated by increased rates of job loss. 
The rapid and large rise in the rate of job loss suggests that labour hoarding is unlikely to have 
contributed greatly to the muted rise in U.K. unemployment. Since the last recession, various 
active labour market policies have been put in place to aid job finding, and their ability to 
respond to a labour market downturn is being tested for the first time.17 Conclusions must remain 
speculative, but evidence presented here on the muted fall in the U.K. outflow rate from 
unemployment in the Great Recession, compared both to previous U.K. recessions and to U.S. 
experience, suggests that these reforms might have played some role on the supply side. In the 
U.S., as in the U.K, the rise in the unemployment inflow rate has been larger than in previous 
recessions, but from a historically low level, so the job loss rate has not exceeded the level 
reached in previous downturns. The major obvious difference between the U.K. and the U.S. is 
in the behaviour of the job finding rate, where the unprecedented fall in the U.S. dwarfs that in 
the U.K. Labour demand appears to have held up better in the U.K. than in the U.S.: there was a 
smaller fall in vacancies. It is possible that the relatively rapid response of the U.K. government 
in providing liquidity to the banking system through quantitative easing and bank bail-outs might 
have played a role in mitigating the impact of the financial crisis on demand. 
Looking forward to the likely course of recovery in the U.K. labour market, signs are more 
mixed. On the plus side, there is no clear sign as yet of a decline in match efficiency of the 
                                                 
17 ALMPs introduced include the introduction of Jobseeker’s Allowance in 1996 with associated carrots and sticks 
to encourage job finding, merging of Employment and Benefits Agencies into Jobcentre Plus from 2002 and the 
various ‘New Deal’ measures, again aimed at improving job finding rates. 
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magnitude that has accompanied the recession in the U.S., where a recovery in vacancies has not 
been met by a reduction in unemployment. In addition, holding constant the duration 
composition of the unemployment pool, the unemployment rate in the U.K. appears to have 
adjusted fully to the shocks that initiated the rise in unemployment.  
What is more concerning is the future course of the duration composition of the unemployed. Up 
to the first quarter of 2010, the rise in long-term unemployment in the U.K. has not been as 
severe as in the past. However, analysis of job finding rates for different unemployment 
durations reveal that they have returned to levels seen in the early 1990s recession in the U.K., 
suggesting that the ingredients for future rises in long-term unemployment already are apparent. 
This highlights the importance of a prompt recovery in economic activity in averting persistent 
unemployment problems in the future of the U.K. labour market. The decline in the rate of job 
loss also needs to be maintained, which might be challenging in the face of likely public sector 
job losses resulting from budgetary cutbacks, projected by the Office of Budget Responsibility 
(OBR) to be in the order of 500,000 over the next 5 years.18 
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Figure 1. Unemployment in the U.K. and U.S. 1971 to 2010 
 
Notes: Seasonally adjusted, monthly data from ONS and BLS. Both use the ILO definition of unemployment. 
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Figure 2. Okun’s Law in the U.K. and U.S. 1971 to 2010 
A. United Kingdom 
 
 
B. United States 
 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using seasonally-adjusted quarterly data from the ONS and the BLS. Trends are 
computed using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 1600.
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Figure 3. Unemployment flows in the U.K. 1970 to 2010 
A. Inflows 
 
 
B. Outflows 
 
 
Notes: Logarithmic scales. Authors’ calculations using Claimant Count data and LFS microdata from 1992. Claimant 
flows prior to 1983 are taken from Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008). 
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Figure 4. Unemployment flows in the U.S. 1970 to 2010 
 
Notes: Logarithmic scale. Authors’ calculations using CPS data on unemployment by duration for the U.S. based on 
the method of Shimer (2007).
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Figure 5. Decomposition of increase in unemployment by recession, U.K. and U.S. 
A. United Kingdom 
 
 
B. United States 
 
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
19
74
 Q
1
19
74
 Q
3
19
75
 Q
1
19
75
 Q
3
19
76
 Q
1
19
76
 Q
3
19
79
 Q
4
19
80
 Q
2
19
80
 Q
4
19
81
 Q
2
19
81
 Q
4
19
82
 Q
2
19
82
 Q
4
19
83
 Q
2
19
83
 Q
4
19
84
 Q
2
19
90
 Q
4
19
91
 Q
2
19
91
 Q
4
19
92
 Q
2
19
92
 Q
4
20
08
 Q
1
20
08
 Q
3
20
09
 Q
1
20
09
 Q
3
20
10
 Q
1
Decline in outflow rate Rise in inflow rate
Decline in U to E Rise in E to U
Log points
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
19
73
 Q
4
19
74
 Q
2
19
74
 Q
4
19
75
 Q
2
19
79
 Q
3
19
80
 Q
1
19
80
 Q
3
19
81
 Q
3
19
82
 Q
1
19
82
 Q
3
19
90
 Q
2
19
90
 Q
4
19
91
 Q
2
19
91
 Q
4
19
92
 Q
2
20
00
 Q
4
20
01
 Q
2
20
01
 Q
4
20
02
 Q
2
20
02
 Q
4
20
03
 Q
2
20
07
 Q
1
20
07
 Q
3
20
08
 Q
1
20
08
 Q
3
20
09
 Q
1
20
09
 Q
3
Decline in outflow rate Rise in inflow rate
Log points
21 
 
Figure 6. Actual vs. flow steady-state unemployment rates, 1975 to 2010 
 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using data on unemployment by duration based on LFS microdata (available every other 
year from 1975 to 1983, every year up to 1992, and quarterly thereafter). Flow steady-state unemployment is the 
unemployment rate that would be converged to if inflow and outflow rates remain constant at their contemporaneous 
values.
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Figure 7. The Beveridge curve in the U.K. and U.S. 2000 to 2010 
A. United Kingdom B. United States 
 
Notes: Monthly, seasonally-adjusted data from the ONS Vacancy Survey for the U.K. (June 2001 to May 2010) and the BLS Job Openings and Labor Turnover 
Survey for the U.S. (December 2000 to May 2010).
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Figure 8. Long-term unemployment in the U.K. and U.S. 1975 to 2010 
 
Notes: Number unemployed for more than six months as a percentage of the labour force. Data for the U.K. are taken 
from the LFS (available every other year from 1975 to 1983, every year from 1983 to 1992, and quarterly thereafter). 
Data for the U.S. are from the monthly Current Population Survey.
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Figure 9. Unemployment-to-employment transition rate by duration, 1992 to 2010 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using quarterly longitudinal Labour Force Survey microdata from 1992Q3 to 2010 Q1. 
Four-quarter moving averages of quarterly data. 
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